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THE IMPACT OF THE SEC ON
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INTRODUCTION
While the role of corporations in American society has been an occasion of
recurring debate in this country for many years, the debate has quickened
again, with perhaps unprecedented intensity, in the last half-decade. Many
circumstances have renewed this controversy. There is the continuing concern
with the accountability of institutions that control so much of the nation's
wealth.' The consumer and civil rights movements have compelled examina-
tion of the extent to which American corporations are inattentive to environ-
mental, safety, equal-employment, and other challenges and have created
demands for measures to heighten corporate sensitivity to these concerns. 2
No single incident or group of incidents, however, has done as much to
intensify these discussions as the revelations following the 1972 Presidential
election that numerous major American corporations, in what seemed to be
clear defiance of the law, contributed to the campaign of a Presidential candi-
date and in some cases had made repeated illegal political contributions in the
past;' that these payments had often been falsified on the books and records
of the corporations;4 that many corporations had also engaged in other ques-
tionable conduct at home and abroad;5 and that in many instances top man-
agement was aware of the misconduct and often masterminded it.6
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1. R. NADER, M. GREEN, & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976).
Justice Douglas noted in his dissent from the Supreme Court's dismissal of SEC v. Medical
Committee for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 409 (1972): "The modern super-corporations, of
which Dow is one, wield immense, virtually unchecked power. Some say that they are 'private
governments,' whose decisions affect the lives of us all" (footnotes omitted).
2. See Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted,
401 U.S. 973 (1970), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 403 (1972); Natural Resource Defense Council,
Inc. v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1974); Note, Disclosure of Payments to Foreign Government
Officials Under the Securities Acts, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1848, 1863-64 (1976).
3. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT OF QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL
CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES (submitted to the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs Comm.) (May 12, 1976) exhibits A & B [hereinafter cited as REPORT].
4. See Hearings on the Activities of American Multinat'l Corps. Abroad Before the Subcomm. on Int'l
Econ. Policy of the House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 36-37 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings]; REPORT, supra note 3, at 41-42.
5. See Hearings, supra note 4, at 36-37; REPORT, supra note 3.
6. See REPORT, supra note 3, at 41.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Most of the ventilation of these matters stemmed from the energetic and
imaginative work of the enforcement staff of the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
7
Many questions have been asked as a consequence of these disclosures.
Among the most probing and basic have been those related to the governance
of the American corporation: Is there an inherent structural defect in the
corporation that permits such misconduct? Is there need for a reconstruction
of the governing structure of the corporation to avoid recurrences of these
events? Is there a willingness and ability to reform within the corporate com-
munity? Is there a need finally for federal incorporation law?
These events have occasioned congressional hearings and numerous legis-
lative proposals, 8 as well as regulatory initiatives; 9 and the end is not in sight.
Perhaps of prime importance, however, has been the acceleration of ten-
dencies which had been emerging slowly and hesitantly for the Securities and
Exchange Commission to move increasingly into matters of corporate govern-
ance and corporate structure, notwithstanding an apparently narrow mandate
only to fashion and enforce a disclosure system for publicly held American
business corporations. The description of this Commission activity-its de-
velopment and its tendencies-is the purpose of this article.
I
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Historically, the internal governance of private corporations has been the
province of state government under our federal system. During the colonial
period corporations-then always organized for special, limited, quasi-public
purposes-were created by royal grants.'0 When the colonies achieved inde-
7. See generally REPORT, supra note 3; cases cited notes 67-71 infra.
8. In December 1977 Congress adopted and the President signed P.L. 95-213, which directly
prohibits United States businesses from, among other things, making any payments, promises of
payment, or authorizations of payment of anything of value to any foreign official, political party,
candidate for office, or intermediary for the purpose of inducing such individual or party (1) to
use his or its influence with a foreign government or instrumentality or (2) to fail to perform his
or its official functions, to assist in the obtaining or retaining of business or to influence legislation
or regulations. This extremely broad language might in some instances prohibit even so-called
facilitating payments (although it would appear that such an interpretation of the bill would be out-
side the intendment of those who drafted the statute). Willful violations of these prohibitions
subject the violator to criminal prosecution and substantial penalties.
In addition to these prohibitions the legislation requires issuers subject to SEC filing require-
ments to maintain adequate books and records and systems of internal control sufficient to pro-
vide specified assurances.
9. See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13185 (Jan. 19, 1977), [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 80,896; SEC Securities Act Release No. 5466 (Mar. 8, 1974), [1974-1975 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,679; Letter from SEC Commissioner R. Hills to Hon. J. E. Moss (May
21, 1976), [1976] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 354 (May 26, 1976); SEC Securities Act Release
No. 10673 (Mar. 8, 1974).
10. J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION 3-7 (1970).
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pendence, though no specific constitutional provision reserved to the states
the right to create corporations, the states assumed that power. 1 In the early
days of the Republic, as before, corporations were organized to perform so-
cially needful and significant tasks: to build and operate roads, waterways,
railroads, flour mills, and so on.12 Only in the first third of the nineteenth
century did the notion become common that corporations organized for less
publicly necessary purposes should be granted privileges accorded earlier
corporations.1 3 Gradually the powers and attendant privileges of corporations
were expanded. While at first the requirement continued that a corporation
be organized for specific purposes defined by the legislature which granted
the charter, later the grant of the charter became less a matter of legislative
discretion and more one of ministerial power. 4
Gradually general laws of incorporation became prevalent in the states.' 5
These laws determined, in effect, the basic structure of any corporation which
was organized under their provisions. If a group banded together under the
umbrella of these laws and followed the ritual prescribed, then certain conse-
quences followed: the shareholders had specified rights and limitations on
their liabilities; the directors had specified rights and responsibilities; certain
matters that were peculiar to the corporation might be dealt with in the char-
ter or bylaws; and some of the basic relationships within the corporation
might be changed by following prescribed procedures. Toward the end of the
nineteenth century, the potentials of this approach to corporation law became
apparent, and first New Jersey, then Delaware and other states, began the
process, often derided, 16 of minimizing the opportunities for shareholders to
participate in corporate affairs and maximizing the latitude of management to
order them.
During the 1920's, the nation experienced an explosive expansion of cor-
porate activity. While this yielded demonstrable economic benefits and a
seemingly high measure of prosperity, the subsequent description of atten-
dant abuses after the 1929 stock market debacle displayed numerous instances
of abuse by corporate officials of the power accorded them under state
11. See generally A. BERLE, JR., HISTORICAL INHERITANCE OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 189
(1950); Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 HARV. L. REV. 105, 149,
165-66 (1888).
12. J. HURST, supra note 10, at 17; R. NADER, M. GREEN, & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 34;
Conard, An Overview of the Laws of Corporation, 71 MICH. L. REV. 623, 632-33 (1973).
13. J. HURST, supra note 10, at 18, 21; R. NADER, M. GREEN, & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at
34.
14. J. HURST, supra note 10, at 46, 56-57.
15.' Id.
16. R. NADER, M. GREEN, & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 51-63; Cary, Federalism and Corpo-
rate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); see Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517,
557-67 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Note, Federal Chartering of Corporations--a Proposal, 61
GEO. L.J. 89 (1975).
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statutes. t7 Federal laws of incorporation or licensing that would succeed or
supplement state legislation, which had been proposed time and again since
the earliest days of the Republic by conservatives and liberals alike, were urged
as means of eliminating the abuses unveiled during congressional hearings.5
Notwithstanding the sorry record played in the hearings and notwithstand-
ing strong urgings, Congress rejected the idea that the federal government
should directly legislate rules for the governance and organization of corpora-
tions and instead adopted a limited approach designed to introduce larger
measures of integrity, not into corporate governance, but rather into the cor-
porate securities distribution and trading processes.
Thus, Congress adopted the Securities Act of 1933, t9 which related prin-
cipally to the distribution of securities by those who issued them and those
who controlled the issuers; and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,20 which
was a potpourri of restraints on the conduct of insiders and trading markets,
mandates for continuous disclosure, and regulation of the proxy-soliciting
process used by listed corporations.
The principal thrust of these statutes was disclosure--disclosure which
would permit investors to make informed investment decisions and permit
shareholders to exercise their rights effectively and intelligently. Congress ap-
peared to eschew the use of disclosure as a regulatory mechanism, that is, the
use of disclosure to modify corporate conduct. This is repeatedly affirmed in
the legislative history of the Acts. 21
17. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICES, S. REP. No.
1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55-68 (1933).
18. James Madison twice proposed to the Constitutional Convention that Congress be given
power to charter corporations. The Convention defeated his motions in the belief that federal
incorporation was unnecessary and would be conducive to the development of monopolies. J.
MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 638 (W. Norton & Co. ed. 1966).
Reformers urged federal licensing of corporations as a solution to abuses of power by business
trusts in the late 18 00's, but Congress passed the federal antitrust laws instead. Watkins, Federal-
ization of Corporations, 13 TENN. L. REV. 89, 92 (1935). Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Taft
each favored federal incorporation, the latter President proposing optional federal incorporation
in a special message to Congress on January 7, 1910. Watkins, supra at 93. One commentator
writes that between 1905 and 1909 thirteen bills which authorized federal incorporation or licens-
ing were introduced in Congress. Note, Federal Chartering of Corporations: Constitutional Challenges,
61 GEO. L.J. 123, 126 (1972). Such proposals surfaced again in the 1930's, most notably in the
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION REPORT ON UTILITY CORPORATIONS, S. Doc. No. 92, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. pt. 69-A (1934). That report contains an exhaustive review of the history of federal licensing
or chartering proposals. Additional proposals (sponsored primarily by the New York Stock Ex-
change) surfaced in the Senate hearings, Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings on S. Res. 84 (72d
Cong.) and S. Res. 56 & 57 (73d Cong.) Before the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 6637, 6583-84, 6678, 6939 (1934). Senators O'Mahoney and Borah continued to intro-
duce federal licensing legislation through the remainder of the 1930's. Reuschlein, Federalization
-Design for Corporate Reform in a National Economy, 91 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 106-07 (1942). See
generally L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 107-11 (1961); FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION REPORT ON
UTILITY CORPORATIONS, supra.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (1970).
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh-I (1970).
21. S. Res. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1934):
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However, the aphorism underlying the legislation was the familiar one ut-
tered by Brandeis in 1914: "Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; the
electric light the most efficient policeman. '22 This statement implies strongly
that disclosure was a means of inducing right conduct, of cleansing society of
misconduct, of causing would-be miscreants to forego undesirable conduct for
fear of exposure.
While the dominant theme in the legislative history of the 1933 and 1934
Acts was indeed disclosure to assist intelligent investment and meaningful par-
ticipation in the corporate suffrage process, still there may be discerned
glimpses of the purposes implied in Brandeis' comment. For instance, the
House committee that considered the 1934 Act said in its report:
23
The Committee is aware that these requirements are not air-tight and that the
unscrupulous insider may still, within the law, use inside information for his
own advantage. It is hoped, however, that the publicity features of the bill will
tend to bring these practices into disrepute and encourage the voluntary
maintenance of proper fiduciary standards by those in control of large corpo-
rate enterprises whose securities are registered on the public exchanges.
Great expectations were entertained for "corporate democracy."2 4 The be-
lief was strong that if shareholders were given the opportunity to participate
meaningfully and with possession of full information in the determination of
issues that were required by state law to be presented to them, e.g., election of
directors, adoption of plans of merger, and the like, corporate conduct might
be molded to a more responsible pattern. Thus, the 1934 Act gave the new-
born SEC very broad power to regulate the solicitation of proxies.
2 5
In contrast to the approach adopted in the 1933 and 1934 Acts, in 1940
Congress chose to direct in a substantive manner the governance of invest-
ment companies, though even here the touch was light and occasional, and
there continued to be heavy emphasis on disclosure. The Investment Com-
pany Act of 194026 established that no more than sixty per cent of the board
of an investment company could be "affiliated" persons, and it defined with
some particularity those who fitted into that category.2 7 Similarly, the 1940
The principal objection against the provisions for corporate reporting is that they consti-
tute a veiled attempt to invest a governmental commission with the power to interfere in
the management of corporations. The Committee has no such intention, and feels that
the bill furnishes no justification for such an interpretation. To make this point abun-
dantly clear, section 13(d) specifically provides that nothing in the act shall be construed
to authorize interference with the management of corporate affairs.
22. L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 62 (Harper Torchbook ed. 1967).
23. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934).
24. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 13 (1934) ("Fair corporate suffrage is an
important right that should attach to every equity security bought on a public exchange."); cf.
SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 518 (3d Cir. 1947) (in enacting the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 "[i]t was the intent of Congress to require fair opportunity for the operation
of corporate suffrage."), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948); J. HURST, supra note 10, at 97.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970).
26. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1-80a-52 (1970).
27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-10, 80a-2(a)(19) (1970).
Page 115: Summer 1977]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Act provided that certain specified matters had to be approved by share-
holders, 28 that indemnification of directors could be made only in speci-
fied circumstances, 29 that directors had to conform to certain standards of con-
duct,3 0 and so on. This contrasted sharply with the statutory standards of the
1933 and 1934 Acts, which avoided entirely the temptation to shape the rela-
tionships among management, directors, and shareholders and the internal
structures of corporations.
In the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,31 too, Congress
touched lightly on the problem of corporate governance by limiting the affili-
ations of directors (subject to SEC rule making) and regulating certain other
narrow corporate governance matters.3 2
Through most of its history the Commission has heeded the general thrust
of the legislative history which led to its creation, and regarded its mandate as
one of disclosure for investor and shareholder use, not disclosure for the
purpose of altering the conduct of corporate management. True, schedule A
of the 1933 Act 3 3 required (subject to modification by the Commission) the
disclosure of compensation paid certain officers and directors and the details
of certain transactions between the corporation and management. It may well
be argued that these disclosure requirements would condition and have con-
ditioned management conduct; every lawyer who has represented a publicly
held corporation has seen an affiliate transaction aborted because of the
necessities of disclosure. Still, these requirements appear to have been de-
signed principally to assist investors and shareholders in making suffrage and
investment decisions. Thus, the relative indifference of the Commission to the
problems of corporate governance seemingly dictated by the 1933 and 1934
Acts continued relatively unabated until the early 1970's.
II
THE EMERGENCE OF SEC CONCERN WITH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
During the first part of the decade the issues of corporate governance and
corporate responsibility became a subject of far wider concern, largely under
the flogging of public interest representatives. 34 Specialized publications such
28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-13(a), 80a-15(a) (1970).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(h) (1970).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1970).
31. Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79-79z-6 (1970).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 7 9g(c) (1970).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1970).
34. See M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY (1971); C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS
(1975); Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corporation: Officers, Directors
and Accountants, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 375 (1975); Eisenberg, The Legal Role of Shareholders and Man-
agement in Modern Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1969); Proceedings, The Airlie
House Symposium, An In-Depth Analysis of the Federal and State Roles in Regulating Corporate
Management, 31 Bus. LAW. 863 (1976); Roth, Supervision of Corporate Management, 51 N.C.L. REV.
1369 (1973).
[Vol. 41 : No. 3
SEC IMPACT ON GOVERNANCE
as Business and Society gave considerable prominence to such issues. The cele-
brated contretemps of former Justice Arthur Goldberg, in which he, as a
TWA board member, insisted upon having a separate staff, fired further dis-
cussion of the role of directors and the limitations on their utility. 35 Such
events moved the discussion out of academic journals, onto the business pages
of the New York Times and into the Wall Street Journal.
The Commission responded to these forces, and during the early seventies
deeper Commission concern with corporate governance became apparent. It
has become increasingly clear that the Commission is no longer content with
its traditional role of abstention from interference with corporate governance
and is restlessly seeking to affect the manner in which corporations are gov-
erned, the relationships between their managements and shareholders, the
constitution of their boards of directors, and the manner in which the various
parts of the corporate community conduct themselves and relate to each
other.
The 1933 and 1934 Acts contain few references to directors. This is sur-
prising in view of the fact that prior to 1933 there had been recurring expres-
sions of concern over the manner in which boards were functioning. For in-
stance, in 1926 the Michigan Supreme Court said: 36
It is the habit in these days for certain well-to-do men with influence in their
respective communities to accept positions on boards of directors of corpora-
tions as honorary directors, and then never render any service except to sign
on the dotted line, vote as requested by the one in charge and afterwards to
cash their directors' checks for attending the meeting. They give no judgment
upon questions of business policy, and make no investigation of the real finan-
cial condition of the company. It is this kind of service by directors that helps
to extract such a tremendous annual toll out of the public who happen to own
industrial securities. The law requires a different kind of service of them.
During the course of the hearings in the House and the Senate which led to
the 1933 and 1934 Acts, there were repeated references to boards which had
failed to perform their duties.3 7 In 1933, after the enactment of the 1933 Act
but before the enactment of the 1934 Act, then Professor William 0. Douglas
remarked in an article, Directors Who Do Not Direct, that 3 8
A popular theme in recent years has been that "Directors should assume
the responsibility of directing and if their manifold activities make real direct-
ing impossible, they should be held responsible to the unsuspecting public for
their neglect."...
35. The Goldberg Variation, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 30, 1972, at 88; New York Times, Oct. 29, 1972,
§ 3, at 1.
36. Chapple v. Jacobson, 234 Mich. 558, 208 N.W. 754 (1926).
37. Stock Exchange Practices, Letter from Counsel for the Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency, pursuant to S. Res. 84, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 7-35 (1933); SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING
AND CURRENCY, STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICES, S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55-68 (1933).
38. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1305-06 (1934).
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In other words, the criticism has been symptomatic of indignation and
disapproval of many different abuses and malpractices disclosed in recent
years ....
This dissatisfaction with directors found explicit expression in the basic
statutes only twice: in the 1933 Act directors as such became liable for mate-
rial omissions and material misstatements in registration statements filed with
respect to the distribution of securities unless they could establish that after
reasonable investigation they had reason to believe and did believe that the
registration statement suffered from no material misstatement or omission; 39
under the 1934 Act directors had a liability to repay profits realized in short-
term trading.
40
All other responsibilities and liabilities of directors found under those Acts
have stemmed either from strictures that applied equally to everyone or as a
consequence of a director's being deemed a "controlling person. '41 For in-
stance, directors might have liability if they directly participate in a violation
of section 12(1) of the 1933 Act 42 or engage in manipulative activity contrary
to section 9 of the 1934 Act.43 Though not explicitly stated in the statutes, it
has been generally accepted that in some circumstances directors might have
liability as aiders and abettors of the offenses of others, 44 as conspirators, 45 or
in some other secondary role.4 n As mentioned, they might be liable as control-
ling persons; both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act contain sections creating
39. Sections 1 l(a)(2) and 1 l(b)(3)(A) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a)(2) and
77k(b)(3)(A) (1970).
40. Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970); 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1970).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 771(l) (1970).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1970).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1970):
§ 2. Principals.
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, com-
mands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully caused an act to be done which if directly performed by him or
another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.
See generally Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy,
In Pari Delecto, Indemnification, and Attribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597 (1972).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970):
§ 371. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud United States.
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States,
or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any pur-
pose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy,
each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a
misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum
punishment provided for such misdemeanor.
See generally Ruder, supra note 44.
46. See L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1476, 1992 (1961), and cases cited therein.
[Vol. 41: No. 3
SEC IMPACT ON GOVERNANCE
liability for controlling persons who could not establish one of the statutorily
afforded defenses.
4 7
Before the 1970's the only occasion on which the Commission com-
mented as a body upon the application of the securities laws to the responsi-
bility of directors was In the Matter of Franchard Corporation,4S and even then it
commented only obliquely. In that administrative proceeding the staff urged
the Commission to determine that the respondent's registration statements
were deficient because, among other reasons, they failed to disclose that the
directors had virtually abdicated their responsibility to the principal officer
and shareholder of the company. The Commission said that the issue was
"... whether the prospectuses were deficient in not disclosing that the direc-
tors, in overseeing the operations of the company, failed to exercise the de-
gree of diligence which the Division believes was required of them under the
circumstances in the context of the day-to-day operations of the company.""
Significantly, the charge was not that there had been a violation of the securities
laws by the failures of the directors to exercise their responsibilities properly;
the assertions of the staff clearly related to deficiencies of disclosure. The
Commission concluded, "We find no deficiencies in this area."5 0
In its decision the Commission adopted a conservative (at least by today's
standards) stance and emphasized that the directors' responsibilities were set
by state law. It said, "The [Securities] Act [of 1933] does not purport, how-
ever, to define federal standards of directors' responsibility in the ordinary
operations of business enterprises and nowhere empowers us to formulate
administratively such regulatory standards."'"
It could be argued, of course, that the staff was not asking for a formula-
tion of regulatory standards but simply a determination that there had been a
deficiency of disclosure. The Commission apparently felt that a decision with
respect to the sufficiency of disclosure would necessarily have involved them
in a substantive determination of matters that lay within the province of state
law. The Commission has not, of course, allowed the problems of making such
determinations to deter it in its administration of rule 14a-8 pertaining to
shareholder proposals.
52
47. Section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970). Section 20 of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1970).
48. 42 S.E.C. 163 (1964).
49. Id. at 175.
50. Id. at 176.
51. Id.
52. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1977). One of the bases upon which management may omit a
proposal from its proxy statement (relying often upon an expression of opinion from the staff of
the Commission as to the propriety of its so doing) is
... [I]f the proposal as submitted is, under the laws of the issuer's domicile, not a
proper subject for action by security holders ....
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It is an interesting speculation whether the Commission would today adopt
such a sweeping statement of the limitations on its power; at a minimum one
might expect that the Commission would suggest that a failure of directors to
exercise their responsibilities under the securities laws is an appropriate mat-
ter for disclosure. As suggested in the Commission's release with respect to
the outside directors of National Student Marketing Corporation, 53 drawing
the line between the general responsibilities of directors and their respon-
sibilities under the securities laws is not easy, and the distinction is not one the
Commission is now overly fastidious in drawing.
However, consistent with its approach in the Franchard case, the Commis-
sion has never established an explicit rule with respect to the conduct of di-
rectors in any formal fashion. The closest it came to this was an effort, follow-
ing a speech by Chairman G. Bradford Cook in 1973, to establish guidelines
for the conduct of directors in securities matters. In his speech, Chairman
Cook said:
54
The Commission feels a sense of obligation to the courts, to public investors,
to the securities bar and to those persons whose activities may place them
within the strictures of the federal securities laws, to enunciate the broad
standards these Acts impose. I believe the players have a right to know what
the rules of the game are.
Subsequently Chairman Ray Garrett, Jr., reaffirmed Chairman Cook's
commitment to develop guidelines. However, he later acknowledged the diffi-
culty of developing such guidelines and stated the project had been
abandoned. 55 During the interim, members of the Chairman's staff had made
a diligent effort to develop such guidelines and had even gone so far as to
draft proposals. Among the difficulties encountered was the fact that the
Commission's authority at its broadest extended only to matters concerning
securities transactions. It would have been difficult to articulate guidelines
that avoided the charge of Commission intrusion into matters of state law,
that meshed appropriately with state requirements, and that provided any
guidance superior to that already furnished by general articulations of direc-
tors' duties.
53. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 11516, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 80,219.
54. The Director's Dilemma, Address before the Southern Methodist University School of
Business Administration, SEC News Release, April 6, 1973, at 4. See [1973] SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) No. 197: A-7 (April 11, 1973).
55. Corporate Directors and the Federal Securities Laws, Address before the Thirteenth An-
nual Corporate Counsel Institute, Northwestern University School of Law, SEC News Release, Oct.
3, 1974, at 4-5. See [1974] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 272: A-11 (Oct. 9, 1974). See also A
Commission Dilemma, Address before the Conference Board, SEC News Release (May 7, 1974).
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A. Policy by Commissioner Statement ("Jawboning")
Notwithstanding this aborted effort to state an official Commission po-
sition on directors' responsibilities in securities matters, individual Commis-
sioners have repeatedly expressed their personal opinions with regard to
directors' responsibilities. These, for the most part, have had the mark of
consistency. In short, while the Commission itself has not spoken as a body,
individual Commissioners have articulated what appear to be the generally
accepted conceptions of the Commission with respect to directoral conduct.
In the 1973 speech mentioned above, Chairman Cook described the respon-
sibility of directors in securities matters in this way:56
[D]irectors are fiduciaries and have an affirmative responsibility to act fairly
and honestly to seek to assure that their corporations do the same. They owe
this responsibility not only to their own shareholders but to all public inves-
tors who buy, sell or hold their company's securities ...
... I believe the federal securities laws require that all directors avoid negli-
gence in the performance of their responsibilities. Now I recognize that negli-
gence is a vague enough term which has filled the casebooks with thousands
of decisions. But perhaps I can focus a bit more precisely on this. Essentially,
a director is negligent if he knows, or should have known, of actions or po-
tential actions that could violate the securities law. The concern here is with
the conduct and not whether it actually is known to be a violation of the law.
The courts do not require proof that an accused director knew the precise
scope of the law. What is required to be shown is that the director knew, or
should have known, of conduct which later is held to be in violation of the
federal securities laws. ...
• . . All directors have a duty to act on wrongdoing of which they are, or
should be, aware-even when they do not carry responsibility for that particu-
lar area. As holders of a public trust, directors who learn of any fraudulent
conduct must insure that appropriate steps are taken to prevent or rectify
violations. This is particularly crucial in the securities field, where most viola-
tions and their impacts are long enduring. The knowledge or indication of
fraudulent corporate actions puts a clear obligation on all directors to insure
that corrective action is taken. ...
... When outside directors are asked to vote on critical issues, they should be
able to determine whether they have enough information upon which to base
an intelligent and informed vote. I do not think the federal securities laws will
tolerate outside directors meeting anything less than this burden, completely
and fully. Outside directors who choose to gamble by approving action with-
out sufficient basis for doing so may find the cost to be very high. As in all
areas of professional responsibility, a great deal of trust must be placed in the
integrity and conscientiousness of all those people who assume the position of
corporate directors. And the existence of civil liability is a deterrent to a
cavalier disregard of these obligations ....
... Outside directors should resist all attempts to pressure them into approv-
ing complex decisions in the absence of adequate time for preparation and
full understanding. This includes insisting on ample time to digest and un-
derstand vital documents. I recognize that it would be far easier if outside
directors could rely upon other members of the board of directors or corpo-
56. The Director's Dilemma, supra note 54, at 7-8.
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rate employees to read and summarize these materials for them, but I believe
that a director's basic responsibility requires that he read these materials. Al-
though directors cannot delegate their responsibility to direct, I do believe
they should have access to reliable experts who can help them decipher some
of the highly technical jargon contained in corporate releases and filings....
In Chairman Cook's remarks the distinction between misconduct under the
federal securities laws and misconduct under the general standards relating
to director conduct is obscured; much of what he appears to consider vio-
lative of the securities laws is merely in violation of the director's duty of care.
During the following four years, Chairman Garrett and other Commis-
sioners addressed these questions on numerous occasions. All of their state-
ments emphasized the high measure of responsibility borne by directors
when their corporations engage in securities transactions, and might well be
read as stating a general standard of conduct. For instance, Commissioner
Loomis said in 1975: 5 7
The Congress quite clearly was dissatisfied with the way boards of directors
operated in the 20's and imposed responsibilities and liabilities upon directors
as one means of protecting investors and advancing the public interest. Any
developments which improve the effectiveness and status of directors should
serve that end. While the idea that directors should serve as watchdogs for
the stockholders can be, and often is, overdone, nevertheless vigilant and in-
dependent directors, functioning effectively, can be an important safeguard.
Similarly, Chairman Garrett on several occasions addressed this problem and
stated:
5 8
In determining whether a director has been diligent and conscientious in per-
forming his responsibilities, I think it important to look at such factors as
whether he regularly attended board meetings, whether he sought and ob-
tained information from management with respect to important corporate
transactions, and carefully considered the information he receives, whether he
was an active participant in board meetings and raised questions with the
management, as well, of course, as the time he spent in discharging his duties.
Earlier Chairman Garrett had suggested that the Commission's activities with
respect to the directors might be seen as an extension of the Commission's
historic franchise, but Garrett wept no tears at the prospect:5 9
It is true that, in order to find authority in ourselves to proceed, and jurisdic-
tion under Rule lOb-5 or cognate provisions of the laws that we administer,
there must be a fraudulent or deceptive element or failure of disclosure of
material information. It is also true that in some cases the gravamen of the
complaint lies in the substantive evil of the conduct involved and not in the
failure to disclose this to investors. In this sense, we may be going beyond
57. Director Responsibility-A Government View, Remarks at Loyola College, Baltimore, Md.,
SEC News Release, April 8, 1975, at 14. See [1975] SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 298: A-29 (April
16, 1975).
58. A Commission Dilemma, supra note 55, at 22.
59. Corporate Directors and the Federal Securities Laws, supra note 55, at 4-5.
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enforcement of disclosure and engaged in efforts to encourage right conduct
among corporate directors. If this is the case, I make no apology for it. Ex-
cept for specific, limited types of misbehavior, there is no other agency, state
or federal, with responsibility or authority over the activities of our publicly-
owned corporations, and while plaintiffs and their attorneys in class actions
on the whole do more than we do in this area, we think there is need for
official federal action.
Similarly, the writer, while a Commissioner of the SEC, stated:60
A skepticism, an alertness to the possibility of wrongdoing on the part of
corporate officers, should be the stock in trade of every director. This is not
to suggest that there is a need of hostility, that directors cannot wine and dine
with the officers of the corporation, that the good fellowship that charac-
terizes many boards cannot be maintained. But it does mean that if a man
assumes a responsibility to the public which a board member does then he
must realize that his client, if you will, is not management but the public
shareholders and the public market place.
B. Policy by Litigation and Settlement
The Commission has not limited itself to words. The greatest impact the
Commission has had on corporate conduct and corporate governance has
been the byproduct of its use of its powers over the disclosure obligations of
corporations.
The potential of disclosure to shape corporate conduct is most clearly seen
in the disclosures that have resulted from the Commission's activities with re-
spect to political contributions and sensitive overseas and domestic payments.
Throughout the development of these disclosures the Commission and its
staff have contended that the purpose of the program was simply to inform
investors and shareholders, 6 1 while critics have contended the Commission's
activity was an unwarranted and unauthorized extension into areas of sub-
stantive law. 62 Regardless of the motives for the Commission's activities, the
fact is that these endeavors have unquestionably affected the manner in which
American corporations are conducting and governing their affairs.
This has been occurring in several ways. First, the Commission has, in
settling litigation involving political contributions and sensitive payments, de-
veloped imaginative approaches to remedies.
60. Directors and the Federal Securities Laws, Address by A. A. Sommer, Jr., before the
Colorado Association of Corporate Counsel, Denver, Colo., [1974] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
No. 241: F-1, F-5 (Feb. 1974).
61. Hearings, supra note 4, at 36 (prepared statement of Commissioner Loomis); see SEC Se-
curities Act Release No. 5466 (Mar. 8, 1974), [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 79,699.
62. See Freeman, The Legality of the SEC's Management Fraud Program, 31 Bus. LAW. 1295
(1976); Note, Disclosure of Payments to Foreign Government Officials Under the Securities Acts, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1848, 1861, 1863, 1869-70 (1976); Note, Foreign Bribes and the Securities Acts' Disclosure
Requirements, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1222, 1241-42 (1976). But see Stevenson, The SEC and Foreign
Bribery, 32 Bus. LAW. 53 (1976).
Page 115: Summer 1977]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
At one time the Commission typically sought only conventional injunctive
relief. However, in recent years it has increasingly tried to expand the rem-
edies sought in an effort to make more meaningful the relief resulting from
civil court proceedings, a response perhaps to the criticism that the typical
result of its civil proceedings has been only a slap on the wrist. Thus, in some
cases the Commission has sought and secured the appointment of a receiver, 63
63. Investment Company Act of 1940, § 42(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41(e):
In any proceeding under this subsection to enforce compliance with section 80a-7 of
this title [relating to proscribed transactions], the court as a court of equity may, to the
extent it deems necessary or appropriate, take exclusive jurisdiction and possession of
the investment company or companies involved and the books, records and assets
thereof, wherever located; and the court shall have jurisdiction to appoint a trustee, who
with the approval of the court shall have power to dispose of any or all of such assets,
subject to such terms and conditions as the court may prescribe.
Pursuant to this authority, the Commission has successfully sought the appointment of receivers
for investment companies in:
(1) SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd 435 F.2d
510 (2d Cir. 1970).
(2) SEC v. Fiscal Fund, 48 F. Supp. 712 (D. Del. 1943).
(3) SEC v. Keller Corp., 323 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1963). The Court in Keller also ex-
pressed its belief that the district court possessed inherent power to appoint a receiver,
independent of the specific statutory authorization in § 42, upon a showing of violations
of the fraud provisions of § 17(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 7 q(a) (1970), and
the registration provisions of the Investment Company Act:
The district court was vested with inherent equitable power to appoint a trustee-
receiver under the facts of this case. The prima facie showing of fraud and misman-
agement, absent insolvency, is enough to call into play the equitable powers of the
court. It is hardly conceivable that the trial court should have permitted those who
were enjoined from fraudulent misconduct to continue in control of Keller's affairs
for the benefit of those shown to have been defrauded. In such cases the appoint-
ment of a trustee-receiver becomes a necessary implementation of injunctive relief."
323 F.2d at 403.
(4) SEC v. S & P Nat'l Corp., 360 F.2d 741 (2d Cir. 1966).
The SEC has also successfully sought appointment of receivers in the absence of explicit statutory
authorization in cases of egregious violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the 1933 and the
1934 Acts.
(1) SEC v. Bowler, 427 F.2d 190 (4th Cir. 1970);
Defendants resist strongly the appointment of a receiver on the ground that the
defendant corporations were not insolvent. The short answer is that the authorities
cited do not limit the appointment of a receiver to cases where insolvency is shown.
Rather, a receiver is permissible and appropriate where necessary to protect the
public interest and where it is obvious, as here, that those who have inflicted seri-
ous detriment in the past must be ousted.
427 F.2d at 198.
(2) SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972):
Once the equity jurisdiction of the district court has been properly invoked by a
showing of a securities law violation, the court possesses the necessary power to
fashion an appropriate remedy. Thus, while neither the 1933 nor the 1934 Acts
specifically authorize the ancillary relief granted in this case, '[ilt is for the federal
courts to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief where federally
secured rights are invaded.'
J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964), 458 F.2d at 1103.
(3) SEC v. Charles Plohn & Co., 433 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1970).
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the rescission of transactions,6 4 the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, 65 and
other remedies.
In recent years, the most noteworthy use of novel remedies has been in
the area of corporate governance and accountability. This practice com-
menced prior to 197366 (the first emergence of the problem of political and
sensitive payments) and has flourished most fully in the context of thoge prob-
lems.
Historically most of the Commission's cases have been concluded with
settlements, for which it has been criticized. As a consequence, it is unclear
whether a court, in the context of a contested case, would conclude that it
could or should grant the sort of relief which the Commission has repeated-
ly secured through settlements. In at least one injunctive case, in which the
Commission sought an ouster of the chief executive officer of a real estate in-
vestment trust, the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia rebuffed
the Commission and said: 67
The relief asked for by the SEC would require the Court to replace the Chief
Executive of ART and appoint new trustees without providing the protection
of continuous supervision of this Court. Even if the power existed, it would
seem unwise under these facts to replace an incumbent President, appoint
additional trustees to serve on the Board, and oversee the operation of the
Trust. Such expansive authority should not be exercised except in the most
extreme cases.
64. SEC v. American Agronomics Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 5667 (N.D. Ohio 1972);
SEC v. Rassco Rural & Suburban Settlement Co., SEC Litigation Release No. 4157 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); SEC v. Codition Corp., SEC Litigation Release No., 3799 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
65. SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 182 (2d Cir. 1972):
Clearly the provision requiring the disgorging of proceeds received in connection with
the Manor offering was a proper exercise of the district court's equity powers. The effec-
tive enforcement of the federal securities laws requires that the SEC be able to make
violations unprofitable. The deterrent effect of an SEC enforcement action would be
greatly undermined if securities law violators were not required to disgorge illicit profits.
(The court of appeals remanded the case for a proper determination of the amount defendants
were required to refund, holding defendants were not required to refund profits made while
utilizing the proceeds of fraudulent action.) SEC v. Golconda Mining Co., [1969-1970 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,504 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 1969); SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d
1301 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. VTR, Inc., SEC Litigation Release No. 3311 (S.D.N.Y. 1965),
[1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,618; SEC %v. Skogit Valley Telephone
Co., SEC Litigation Release Nos. 3390, 3393, & 3482 (W.D. Wash. 1965-66); SEC v. Parvin
Dohrmann Co., SEC Litigation Release No. 4848 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); SEC v. Frigitemp Corp., No.
73-596 (D.D.C. March 28, 1973).
66. SEC v. VTR, Inc., SEC Litigation Release No. 3311 (S.D.N.Y. 1965):
In lieu of appointing a receiver, the court directed the controlling group to cause the
election of four independent directors [of a five-man board] designated by the court to
supervise the filing of proper annual reports and proxy statements with the Commission
and to supervise a determination of the exact amount misappropriated.
32 SEC ANN. REP. 116-17 [1966]; SEC v. Tilco, Inc., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 93,240 (D.D.C. 1971).
67. SEC v. American Realty Trust, 429 F. Supp. 1148, 1177-78 (E.D. Va. 1977).
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The relief sought here by the SEC, the appointment of trustees and re-
moval of the President, infringe on activities traditionally controlled by the
states. The federal securities laws are at best a limited federal corporate law
and the SEC and federal courts are "bound to respect the limits which are
inherent in a statutory scheme aimed at ensuring disclosure in the sale of
securities and not the substantive regulation of business itself." Equitable Rem-
edies in SEC Actions, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev., 1188, 1216 (1976). Except in the most
egregious cases, courts should not interfere with corporate democracy. Those
circumstances are not present in the instant action.
It is through the medium of settlements of these proceedings that the
Commission has made its most notable inroads into corporate governance and
accountability. And it is the implications of these settlements that will endure
and influence corporations long after the issues of political and sensitive pay-
ments have ceased to claim newspaper space.
Basically the Commission's settlements involving governance and account-
ability may be grouped in this way: (1) settlements which require the ap-
pointment of additional outside directors; 68 (2) settlements in which specific
responsibilities, sometimes of an ad hoc nature, sometimes of a continuing
nature, are imposed on an existing board;6 9 (3) settlements which require the
appointment of an audit and/or other committee given special responsibili-
ties; 70 (4) settlements which require the appointment of a special counsel to
68. SEC v. Canadian Javelin, SEC Litigation Release No. 6441 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), 4 SEC DOCKET
No. 17, at 620 (June 30, 1974); SEC v. Mattel, Inc., SEC Litigation Release Nos. 6531 & 6532
(D.D.C. 1974), 5 SEC DOCKET No. 8, at 241 (Oct. 16, 1974).
69. SEC v. Emersons Ltd., SEC Litigation Release No. 7392 (D.D.C. 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET No.
12, at 667 (May 25, 1976); SEC v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., SEC Litigation Release No. 7479
(D.D.C. 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET No. 20, at 1074 (July 21, 1976); SEC v. Brad Ragan, Inc., SEC
Litigation Release No. 7681 (W.D.N.C. 1976), 11 SEC DOCKET No. 1, at 1113 (Dec. 14, 1976);
SEC v. General Telephone and Electronics Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 7760 (D.D.C.
1977), 11 SEC DOCKET No. 16, at 1662 (Feb. 15, 1977).
70. SEC v. Canadian Javelin, SEC Litigation Release No. 6441 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), 4 SEC
DOCKET No. 17, at 620 (June 30, 1974); SEC v. Mattel, Inc., SEC Litigation Release Nos. 6531 &
6532 (D.D.C. 1974), 5 SEC DOCKET No. 8, at 241 (Oct. 16, 1974); SEC v. American Ship Building
Co., SEC Litigation Release No. 6534 (D.D.C. 1974), 5 SEC DOCKET No. 8, at 242 (Oct. 16, 1974);
SEC v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., SEC Litigation Release No. 6711 (D. Minn. 1975), 6 SEC
DOCKET No. 6, at 272 (Feb. 18, 1975); SEC v. Gulf Oil Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 6780
(D.D.C. 1975), 6 SEC DOCKET No. 11, at 465 (March 25, 1975); SEC v. Missouri Public Service
Co., SEC Litigation Release No. 7299 (W.D. Mo. 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET No. 2, at 9117 (March 16,
1976); SEC v. General Tire & Rubber Co., SEC Litigation Release No. 7386 (D.D.C. 1976), 9 SEC
DOCKET No. 12, at 667 (May 25, 1976); SEC v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., SEC Litigation
Release No. 7443 (D.D.C. 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET No. 17, at '920 (May 30, 1976); SEC v. Chicago
Milwaukee Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 7472 (D.D.C. 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET No. 19, at 1008
(July 19, 1976); SEC v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., SEC Litigation Release No. 7603 (D.D.C. 1976),
10 SEC DOCKET No. 13, at 687 (Oct. 19, 1976); SEC v. Diversified Industries, Inc., SEC Litigation
Release No. 7650 (D.D.C. 1976), 10 SEC DOCKET No. 19, at 980 (Oct. 30, 1976); SEC v. Brad
Ragan, Inc., SEC Litigation Release No. 7681 (W.D.N.C. 1976), 11 SEC DOCKET No. 1, at 1113
(Dec. 14, 1976); SEC v. Uniroyal Inc., SEC Litigation Release No. 7759 (D.D.C. 1977), 11 SEC
DOCKET No. 9, at 1581 (Feb. 8, 1977); SEC v. General Telephone & Electronics Corp., SEC
Litigation Release No. 7760 (D.D.C. 1977), 11 SEC DOCKET No. 10, at 1662 (Feb. 15, 1977); SEC
v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., SEC Litigation Release No. 7930 (D.D.C. 1977), 12 SEC DOCKET No. 6,
at 502 (June 7, 1977).
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conduct an investigation into certain practices; 71 and (5) the appointment
of a special auditor to assist in the work of special counsel.7 2
A review of these cases indicates that some settlements have combined dif-
ferent components. For example, the Canadian Javelin settlement provided
that forty per cent of its directors be outside, independent directors approved
by the Commission; that an outside counsel approved by the SEC be named
to take responsibility for reviewing the dissemination of all information to the
public and for securing compliance with securities laws by Javelin; that Javelin
designate a public-information officer; and that Javelin establish a standing
committee a majority of which would be independent outside directors. The
settlement further stipulated that the special outside counsel could not be re-
moved without prior notification of the Commission. 73 In another case, after
the Commission was informed that Mattel, Inc., filed financial statements
which overstated its profits and understated its costs, a settlement was reached
which stipulated that the majority of Mattel's board of directors would be
SEC- and court-approved unaffiliated directors, that the new unaffiliated di-
rectors could appoint a special counsel, and that the special counsel could
appoint a special auditor to be approved by Mattel, the Commission, and the
court in order to audit the financial statements of Mattel.74 Emersons Ltd.'s
difficulties with false financial statements and illegal payments from liquor,
wine, and beer producers resulted in the requirement that Emersons appoint
three approved independent directors and additional independent directors
as replacements for any present board members who cease to serve as direc-
tors until independent directors constitute a majority of Emersons' board of
directors. 75 This particular part of the settlement may be distinguished from
the Mattel settlement in that the number of independent directors would in-
crease gradually. 76 The Emersons settlement also provided for the appointment
71. SEC v. Canadian Javelin, SEC Litigation Release No. 6441 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), 4 SEC DOCKET
No. 17, at 620 (June 30, 1974); SEC v. Mattel, Inc., SEC Litigation Release Nos. 6531 & 6532
(D.D.C. 1974), 5 SEC DOCKET No. 8, at 241 (Oct. 16, 1974); SEC v. General Tire & Rubber Co.,
SEC Litigation Release No. 7386 (D.D.C. 1974), 9 SEC DOCKET No. 12, at 664 (May 25, 1976);
SEC v. Emersons Ltd., SEC Litigation Release No. 7392 (D.D.C. 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET No. 12, at
667 (May 25, 1976); SEC v. Brad Ragan, Inc., SEC Litigation Release No. 7681 (W.D.N.C. 1976),
11 SEC DOCKET No. 1, at 1113 (Dec. 14, 1976); SEC v. Ormand Inds., Inc., SEC Litigation
Release No. 7910 (D.D.C. 1977), 12 SEC DOCKET No. 4, at 415 (May 29, 1977).
72. SEC v. Mattel, Inc., SEC Litigation Release Nos. 6531 & 6532 (D.D.C. 1974), 5 SEC
DOCKET No. 8, at 241, 242 (Oct. 16, 1974); SEC v. Brad Ragan, Inc., SEC Litigation Release No.
7681 (W.D.N.C. 1976), 11 SEC DOCKET No. 1, at 1113 (Dec. 14, 1976).
73. SEC v. Canadian Javelin, SEC Litigation Release No. 6441 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), 4 SEC DOCKET
No. 17, at 620 (June 30, 1974).
74. SEC v. Mattel, Inc., SEC Litigation Release Nos. 6531 & 6532 (D.D.C. 1974), 5 SEC
DOCKET No. 8, at 241 (Oct. 16, 1974).
75. SEC v. Emersons Ltd., SEC Litigation Release No. 7392 (D.D.C. 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET No.
12, at 667 (May 25, 1976).
76. Compare SEC v. Emersons Ltd., SEC Litigation Release No. 7392 (D.D.C. 1976), 9 SEC
DOCKET No. 12, at 668 (May 25, 1976) with SEC v. Mattel, Inc., SEC Litigation Release Nos. 6531
& 6532 (D.D.C. 1974), 5 SEC DOCKET No. 8, at 241 (Oct. 16, 1974).
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of a special counsel and a special committee comprised of the independent
directors, who would review financial reporting, releases, and communications
to the public, accounting policies, and the selection of auditors. 77
Other SEC settlements have affected corporate governance and conduct in
a variety of ways. In the Foremost-McKesson settlement the SEC required only
that the existing board assume some additional responsibilities. These respon-
sibilities included the completion of an investigation into various matters, the
submission of a written report, and the maintenance by the board of a policy
prohibiting any cash payment or rendering of merchandise in violation of
laws or regulations, or the payment of anything of value which is material in
nature directly or indirectly to any foreign governmental official or entity.
7
The General Tire and Rubber Company was required to establish a special
review committee to conduct an extensive investigation with the help of a
special counsel. 79 Again in the Missouri Public Service Company settlement, a
special review committee was required to investigate unlawful contributions.8 0
The major requirement in the Anheuser-Busch, Inc., settlement was the ap-
pointment of a review person by the company's auditing committee, with the
approval of the Commission, to review the adequacy of the auditing
committee's investigation and the disclosure based thereon."' The GTE set-
tlement stipulated that GTE's board of directors would adhere to guidelines
adopted by GTE with respect to payments by GTE to any official or employee
of any private customer or government or to any official or employee of any
entity owned or controlled by any government when those payments are un-
lawful under the laws of the United States or such foreign country. Any
change in the guidelines must be filed with the Commission.8 2
In a settlement 3 little noticed until Chairman Harold Williams referred to
it in his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting
and Management in June 1977, the Commission caused the court to set forth
with particularity its notions of what the duties of an audit committee should
be. While the settlement, of course, is binding only upon the defendants, it
77. SEC v. Emersons Ltd., SEC Litigation Release No. 7392 (D.D.C. 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET No.
12, at 668 (May 25, 1976).
78. SEC v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., SEC Litigation Release No. 7479 (D.D.C. 1976), 9 SEC
DOCKET No. 20, at 1074 (July 21, 1976).
79. SEC v. General Tire & Rubber Co., SEC Litigation Release No. 7386 (D.D.C. 1974), 9
SEC DOCKET No. 12, at 664 (May 25, 1976).
80. SEC v. Missouri Public Service Co., SEC Litigation Release No. 7299 (W.D. Mo. 1976), 9
SEC DOCKET No. 2, at 114 (March 16, 1976).
81. SEC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., SEC Litigation Release No. 7930 (D.D.C. 1977), 12 SEC
DOCKET No. 6, at 502 (June 7, 1977).
82. SEC v. General Telephone and Electronics Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 7760
(D.D.C. 1977), 11 SEC DOCKET No. 10, at 1662 (Feb. 15, 1977).
83. SEC v. Killearn Properties, Inc., [1977] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 421: D-2, 3 (Sept.
28, 1977).
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does provide significant insights into the Commission's conception of audit
committees' duties in general. The court order referred to three "special
duties" of the audit committee:
8 4
1. Review the engagement of the independent auditors, including
their compensation, the scope and extent of their review of the
company's financial statement, and the audit procedures they will
utilize;
2. Review with the company's independent accountants and chief fi-
nancial officer (as well as other appropriate personnel) the general
policies and procedures used by the company with respect to in-
ternal auditing, accounting, and financial controls;
3. Review releases by the company to the media, shareholders, and
the public which concern financial matters.
Under each of these three areas the order specifies with considerable par-
ticularity the actions which the audit committee must take in carrying out its
responsibilities.
The above is by no means a complete delineation of the cases in which the
Commission in negotiating settlements has secured relief which has affected
the structure of corporate governance and the manner in which authority is
exercised within the corporation; a member of the Commission staff has in-
formally stated to the writer that he counts some sixty cases in which the
settlements have affected corporate governance. These cases and others not
discussed display a remarkable variety of judicially mandated techniques and
practices to deal with corporate wrongdoing through modifications of corpo-
rate practices and structures. These judicial orders and others similar to them,
of course, constitute direct intervention in corporate structure and corporate
governance. The orders are binding upon the corporations under penalty of
contempt of court and appear to be binding in perpetuity. Thus, in effect, the
charters of these affected corporations are amended and the requirements of
state corporation laws, which generally require only that a corporation have a
board of directors and do not specify any particulars (e.g., the number of
inside versus outside directors) other than the minimum number of directors,
are significantly and permanently supplemented by federal court decree.
The decrees in these cases obviously are only binding on the parties to the
case; nonetheless the emergence of these patterns in numerous cases has
drawn considerable attention to the various role players in the corporate pro-
cess. While it is difficult to trace such corporate reforms as the introduction of
larger numbers of outside directors, the institution of audit committees, and
the like directly to these settlements, the publicity accorded such settlements
84. Id.
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has certainly in some measure conditioned the minds of corporate leaders to
accept these trends and to enhance them. This is evident in many of the
discussions of these problems which frequently allude to the settlements .
5
C. Policy by Coaxing
A second, perhaps even more far-reaching example of the manner in
which corporate conduct has been conditioned by the disclosures arising out
of Watergate is found in the Commission's so-called voluntary disclosure
program.
On July 17, 1975, the Commission, speaking through Commissioner Philip
A. Loomis, Jr., who testified before the Subcommittee on International Eco-
nomic Policy of the House of Representatives International Relations Com-
mittee, proposed that corporations which suspected that they might have en-
gaged in questionable conduct undertake an internal investigation and then
publicly report the results of it. s6 Commissioner Loomis stated:
87
With respect to past activities, we propose to publish a summary of the
cases which we have already brought, together with a description of other
situations of a similar nature which have come to our attention, and accom-
pany this by a suggestion that other companies who, upon reviewing their
own affairs, conclude that they may have a similar problem might proceed
somewhat as follows:
First, make a careful investigation of the facts, similar, I might add, to
those that have been made by the companies we have had the problem with,
under the auspices of persons not involved in the activities in question, such
as their independent directors.
If this investigation discloses that a problem does in fact exist, the board of
directors of the company should consider in consultation with their profes-
sional advisers what types of disclosures seem to be called for.
Such companies would probably find it advisable to discuss the matter with
our staff prior to filing any documents with us. Companies often do that
where they have a somewhat novel problem.
In order to consider the adequacy of the proposed disclosure, our staff
would need to be full), informed as to the facts.
While our enforcement activity in this area will continue, we are going
forward, the foregoing procedures could lessen the need for enforcement ac-
tion in particular cases, especially where the Commission is informed in ad-
vance that a company which is not now under investigation proposed to pro-
ceed in this manner.
How many corporations have satisfied all the conditions of the voluntary
program is uncertain, but at the date of this writing about four hundred cor-
porations have made public disclosure of questionable or illegal activity at
home or abroad.
85. See Comment, Court Appointed Directors. 64 GEo. L.J. 737 (1976); see generally Northrop's
Punishment for Campaign Giving, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 24, 1975, at 60.
86. Hearings, supra note 4, at 63-64.
87. Id.
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The Commission has never adopted any rules incorporating the volun-
tary disclosure program. The only official elaboration has been in the Com-
mission's May 12, 1976, report of the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs Committee and in statements by Commissioners and staff.18
To qualify for the uncertain benefits of the voluntary disclosure program
(these were asserted to be a reduction in the likelihood of a Commission pro-
ceeding against the errant corporation and its officers) 9 a corporation, as
noted, would have to undertake to cease the practices described.
No one has suggested that the Commission has the power to proscribe
these activities, although it has often negotiated settlements that included un-
dertakings and injunctions that prohibited substantive misconduct as well as
the failure to disclose it. 90 But by holding out the conditional promise of im-
munity from Commission proceedings, the Commission has succeeded in
causing innumerable companies to undertake to desist from courses of con-
duct some of which at least were not clearly illegal.
By its failure to articulate standards for disclosure concerning sensitive
payments and related matters (except to the extent that standards may be said
to be stated in its May 12, 1976, report), the Commission has created in the
corporate community and among corporate advisors profound uncertainty
concerning the kinds of conduct that are subject to the SEC reporting
requirements." l Partly as a consequence of this uncertainty, a very large
proportion of the publicly held companies in the United States (and there are
some ten thousand subject to the 1934 Act reporting requirements) have en-
gaged in some internal soul searching, and many of those which have not
made disclosures have nonetheless determined to forego the types of conduct
that have been the subject of suits brought by the Commission, if for no other
reason than to create equities which might forestall an injunction in the event
the SEC discovered the nondisclosure and brought an action. (While much is
made of the number of companies that have made disclosures, it should not
be overlooked that there are over nine thousand companies reporting to the
Commission that have not made any disclosures.) And it is not unlikely,
though it may not be acknowledged, that the increased presence of outsiders
on boards of directors and the organization of audit committees have often
flowed from these behavioral decisions.
The impact of these disclosures upon the behavior of corporate America
would appear to exceed by far the impact on investors. Most studies that have
88. REPORT, supra note 3, at 6-13.
89. Id. at 8 n.7.
90. SEC v. Northrop Corp., No. 75-0536 (D.D.C., filed April 18, 1975); SEC v. Phillips Pe-
troleum Co., No. 75-0308 (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 1975).
91. Lowenfels, Questionable Corporate Payments and the Federal Securities Laws, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV.
23 (1976); Note, Disclosure of Corporate Payments and Practices: Conduct Regulation Through the Fed-
eral Securities Laws, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 681 (1977).
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been done (though none claim to be conclusive or of definitive depth) would
indicate that disclosures of improper activity abroad or at home have not had
a lasting effect on either the prices or volume of trading of a company's
securities. 92 Anecdotal evidence of the relative indifference of shareholders to
confessions of corporate misconduct is common: at the first United Brands
stockholder meeting following the tragic suicide of Eli Black and the disclo-
sure of United Brands' bribes in a Central American country to forestall a
substantial levy on bananas, shareholders present were far more interested in
conventional matters-earnings prospects, for instance-than in the relatively
recent scandal involving their company.93 Similarly, shareholders at other
meetings have shown little concern with the morality of their officers. At
Northrop Corporation, the governing structure of which was substantially
reorganized as a consequence of shareholder litigation, the restructured
board, including a majority of outsiders agreeable to the plaintiff in the ac-
tion, restored the principal author of the corporation's misconduct to all of
his offices because they concluded his talents were essentially irreplaceable.
94
Ephemeral as the consequences of the disclosures may be to investors and
shareholders, the consequences in the structure and governance of these cor-
porations, both those making disclosures and those not, remain and bid fair
to become a permanent part of the corporate landscape.
D. Policy by Statutory Transference
Another subtle source of influence on corporate governance derives from
the Investment Company Act of 1940.9 5 As remarked above, this Act more
than any other statute administered by the Commission addresses questions of
corporate governance explicitly. It may be suggested that in some measure
the attitude of the Commission and the staff with regard to such matters is
determined by concepts of directoral responsibility which have developed
under the 1940 Act. Less as a consequence of Commission activity than of
private litigation, the responsibilities of investment company directors under
the 1940 Act have been increasingly delineated. While most of the cases in-
volve situations that are unique to investment companies-transfer of
investment-advisor contracts, the desirability of using different arrangements
for executing securities transactions, the fairness of management fees-the
courts have nonetheless been steadily stating principles that may have a much
broader relevance. 9 6
92. See Note, Disclosure of Payments to Foreign Government Officials Under the Securities Acts, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1848, 1855 n.45 (1976); Griffin, Disclosure Policy and the Securities Markets: The
Impact of the 1975-76 Sensitive Payment Disclosure (submitted to the SEC Advisory Committee
on Corporate Disclosure) (Dec. 1976).
93. New York Times, August 19, 1974, at 45, 51.
94. Wall Street Journal, Jan. 17, 1975, at 1; Id. Jan. 18, 1975, at 14.
95. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-l-80a-52 (1970).
96. See, e.g., Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971); Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 399 F.
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The evolution of concepts originating in the 1940 Act into concepts
broadly applicable to corporations in general is, of course, difficult to docu-
ment; as a matter of fact, in its Tannenbaum brief the Commission explicitly
disavowed any intent to state standards that had applicability beyond the 1940
Act.97 However, discussions with staff members and examination of evolving
attitudes indicate that the standards stated in that brief, as an example, in-
deed bear close similarity to the Commission's and the staff's convictions con-
cerning the responsibility of all outside directors: 98
Specifically, the decision of the board of directors of this investment com-
pany-to forego capture of excess brokerable commissions-should be dis-
positive if this Court satisfies itself that-
(1) in so deciding, the independent directors were truly independent of
domination by or undue influence of the advisor;
(2) the independent directors were completely informed, and fully aware,
of the available alternative; and
(3) the decision reached was a reasonable business judgment made after a
thorough review of all relevant factors by the independent members of the
board.
While the footnote following this portion of the brief disavows any inten-
tion to apply these standards to non-investment-company directors, it is
nonetheless difficult to derive these standards solely from the 1940 Act. They
resemble closely statements made by Commission and staff members concern-
ing their conceptions of the responsibilities of all directors, especially outside
directors, under the securities laws in general. 99
E. Policy by Rule Making-Direct and Indirect
The Commission has moved cautiously toward the imposition-by-rule of
substantive standards in the area of corporate governance. Two examples of
this have been the release proposing rules in connection with "going private"
transactions and the release announcing hearings on changes in the proxy
rules.
In its initial release with respect to going private, 10 0 the Commission pro-
posed alternative rules. Both of these proposed rules, in addition to requiring
extensive disclosure (no one appears to dispute that the Commission has
power to compel disclosure under section 13(e) of the 1934 Act), contained
Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Fogel v. Chestnutt, 533 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1975); Papilsky v. Berndt,
466 F.2d 251 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1077 (1972); Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337 (2d
Cir. 1971).
97. Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission (amicus curiae) at 20 n.24. Tannen-
baum v. Zeller, 399 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
98. Id. at 20.
99. See generally, The Director's Dilemma, supra note 54; A Commission Dilemma, supra note
55.
100. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5567 (Feb. 6, 1975), 6 SEC DOCKET No. 7, at 250 (Feb.
25, 1975).
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substantive provisions: e.g., a requirement that a "fair price" be determined in
a specified way; provisions similar to those contained in section 14(d) of the
1934 Act pertaining to third-party tender offers with respect to withdrawal of
deposited shares; requirement of a "take out" period for shareholders who
did not accept the offer; and a requirement that there be a valid business
purpose for the transaction. In addition to these proposals, the Commission
asked specifically for comment on other substantive questions such as a possi-
ble requirement that controlling interests vote their shares in proportion to
the votes of other shareholders or perhaps with the majority. 0 1
On November 17, 1977, the Commission published for comment revised
proposed rules concerning going-private transactions. While the revised rules
depart in many ways from the earlier proposals, they would most significantly
require that the transaction be fair, and would specify procedures and indicia
which would tend to reflect fairness. 2
Recently, again purporting to use its powers over disclosure, the Commis-
sion issued two releases announcing the proceedings looking toward the
amendment of the proxy rules. The releases suggested several areas for con-
sideration; many of these bore in one measure or another upon questions of
corporate governance. For instance, the Commission solicited comment on
whether shareholders should have access to management's proxy-soliciting
material for the purpose of making nominations for election to the board of
directors; whether in conflict situations affiliates or other persons should be
required to vote their shares in accordance with the majority or in proportion
to the votes of the shareholders not having a conflict; whether the Commis-
sion should recommend legislation providing for federal incorporation or
federally established minimum standards for officers' and directors' conduct;
whether institutions should be required before voting shares they hold to so-
licit the views of persons having an economic interest in the shares.' 0 3
In a similar vein the Commission's Advisory Committee on Corporate Dis-
closure recommended that' 0 4
The Commission should develop a package of disclosure requirements
that, taken as a whole, will strengthen the ability of boards of directors to
operate as independent, effective monitors of management performance and
that will provide investors with a reasonable understanding of the organiza-
tion and role of the board of any given issuer.
101. The argument of those who assert that the Commission was not given power to regulate
substantive matters under section 13(e) is well stated in the comment of the Committee on Fed-
eral Regulation of Securities, ABA Section of Corporation, Banking, and Business Law (submit-
ted in response to the proposed rule making) (July 18, 1975).
102. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5884, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 81,366 (Nov.
17, 1977).
103. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13482 (Apr. 28, 1977), 12 SEC DOCKET No. 2,
at 239 (May 10, 1977); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13901 (Aug. 29, 1977), 20 SEC
DOCKET No. 20, at 1630 (Sept. 12, 1977).
104. SEC ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE, FINAL REPORT (November 3,
1977).
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The adoption of these proposals would represent a novel exercise of
power by the Commission. It might well be that this exercise would be tested
and found wanting; however, the peculiar dynamics of securities regulation
minimize the likelihood of such a challenge. Issuers seeking proxy statement
clearance have not the time to contest the Commission's demand for addi-
tional information or text modification, and it is unlikely that an issuer would
find it prudent or feasible to contest, for instance, a Commission requirement
with respect to proposals to amend a corporation's bylaws to provide for share-
holder nominations. Similarly, a company seeking to go private would probably
find compliance with the Commission's mandates a less costly, more reliable,
and more expeditious process than prolonged litigation. Securities transactions
and proxy solicitations are time-limited: events do not generally permit a long
delay. Furthermore, while the Supreme Court has curtailed significantly the
applications of the federal securities laws,' 0 5 the Commission's rule-making
power has not been limited; hence an assault upon action taken under the
Commission's broad rule-making power would have an uncertain outcome.
Finally, while one may read the Supreme Court decisions as indicating a
strong tendency to limit the implication of remedies, there is nothing in re-
cent Supreme Court history to justify the conclusion that the Court felt simi-
larly inclined to deal narrowly with agency rule-making powers.
Another example of proposed rule making that appears to represent a
broad expansion of asserted power, and which has potentially significant con-
sequences for corporate governance, is SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13185.
In 1976, as a consequence of the disclosures with respect to sensitive pay-
ments, including disclosure that these had generally been accompanied by fi-
nancial record falsification, a number of legislative proposals were introduced
in Congress to deal with the problem. The proposals that gained the strongest
support were contained in S. 3664. These provided in substance that United
States businesses would be prohibited from, among other things, making
payments to any foreign official, political party, candidate for office, or in-
termediary for the purpose of inducing some individual or party to influence
a foreign government, its legislation, or regulations or fail to perform official
functions or assist in obtaining or retaining business. More important
perhaps, this legislation provided that it would constitute a violation of law if
a company failed to maintain proper internal controls or failed to maintain
proper books and records, or if anyone misrepresented information to an
auditor or falsified the records of the corporation.
This legislation passed the Senate on September 15, 1976, by a vote of 88
to 0 and it was confidently expected to pass the House by a wide margin.
However, a combination of circumstances prevented the House Rules Coin-
105. See cases cited notes 107-11 infra.
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mittee from voting on the proposal, and thus it died with the 94th
Congress.1
06
Shortly thereafter, however, the Commission proposed to adopt, virtually
verbatim, the accounting portions of the aborted legislation under its tradi-
tional rule-making power. Thus in SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13185 it
proposed rules that would require issuers registered under section 12 of the
Exchange Act or required to file periodic reports under section 15(d) of that
Act to
10 7
(a) maintain books and records which accurately reflect the transac-
tions and dispositions of assets of the issuer;
(b) maintain a system of internal accounting controls which would
provide reasonable assurance that:
(1) transactions are executed in accordance with management's
general or specific authorization;
(2) transactions are recorded as necessary (a) to permit prepara-
tion of financial statements in conformity with generally ac-
cepted accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to
such statements and (b) to maintain accountability for assets;
(3) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with manage-
ment's authorization; and
(4) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the ex-
isting assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is
taken with respect to any differences.
The proposal would also have prohibited:
(a) falsification of an issuer's accounting records; and
(b) false or misleading statements to accountants by directors, offi-
cers, or shareholders of an issuer.
In December 1977 Congress adopted and the President signed Public Law
95-213, which included the prohibitions against foreign payments and some
of the accounting provisions-with some modifications-but omitted the pro-
hibitions against falsification of records and misrepresentation to accountants.
The Commission is however considering the adoption of a rule incorporating
the provisions omitted from the statute.
The enactment by Congress of a requirement that corporations maintain
systems of internal controls obviated the adoption of a rule to this effect by
the Commission. However, the fact that the Commission seriously considered
such a rule is clear evidence of its willingness to extend its reach over corpo-
rate governance by the rule-making route.
106. The bill was, however, reintroduced by Senator Proxmire in the present session of Con-
gress (S. 305, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)) and was adopted and signed in December.
107. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13185 (Jan. 19, 1977), [Current] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 80,896, 42 FED. REG. 4854 (1977).
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Ironically, the increasing Commission presence in the area of corporate
structure and governance occurs at a time when the Supreme Court has been
delineating the limits of the federal securities laws more narrowly than at any
time in their history. It has sharply rejected efforts to expand the definition
of "security,"'08 the ability of rule lOb-5 plaintiffs to recover, 10 9 the availability
of relief under the tender-offer provisions of the 1934 Act to defeated tender
offerors, °10 the standing of someone who is neither a purchaser nor seller to
maintain an action under rule lOb-5,1 11 and the applicability of rule lOb-5 to
breaches of fiduciary duty by those having control of corporations."l 2 How-
ever, the clearest rejection of the effort to stretch the federal reach into areas
traditionally regarded as those of state government was stated in Cort v.
Ash:' 1
3
Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds
to corporate directors on the understanding that, except where federal law
expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stock-
holders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation ....
• .. [B]ecause implication of a federal right of damages on behalf of a
corporation under § 610 would intrude into an area traditionally committed
to state law without aiding the main purpose of § 610, we reverse.
The Commission has intervened in corporate governance in more direct
ways. In 1976, SEC Chairman Roderick M. Hills wrote William M. Batten,
chairman of the New York Stock Exchange, urging that the exchange amend
its listing agreement to require each listed company to have an audit commit-
tee made up predominantly if not exclusively of outside directors. 14 The
New York Stock Exchange responded affirmatively to this and on March 9,
1977,15 adopted an amendment that required domestic companies already
listed on the exchange to comply by June 30, 1978, and those listing for the
first time to comply before listing. The proposal required that'1
Each domestic company with common stock listed on the NYSE, as a condi-
tion of listing and continued listing of its securities on the NYSE, shall estab-
lish no later than June 30, 1978, and maintain thereafter an audit committee
comprised solely of directors independent of management and free from any
relationships that, in the opinion of its Board of Directors, would interfere
with the exercise of independent judgment as a committee member.
108. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
109. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
110. Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1976 (1977).
111. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
112. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
113. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84-85 (1975).
114. See REPORT, supra note 3, Exhibit D.
115. See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13346 (Mar. 9, 1977), 11 SEC DOCKET No. 15, at
1945 (March 22, 1977), for a discussion of this matter.
116. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13245, (Feb. 4, 1977), 11 SEC DOCKET No. 11, at 1072
(Feb. 21, 1977), 42 FED. REG. 8737 (1977).
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F. Policy by Pronouncement
In cases and reports on investigations involving outside directors the
Commission has with considerable particularity set forth its conception of the
responsibilities of directors; again it should be emphasized that these have
occurred in the context of settlements and do not represent judicial conclu-
sions concerning directors' responsibilities.
In Report of Investigation in the Matter of Stirling Homex Corporation Relating
to Activities of the Directors of Stirling Homex Corporation"'7 the Commission criti-
cized sharply the failures of two outside directors. While recognizing that the
outside directors were deceived by the management of Stirling Homex, the
Commission faulted them on several scores:l"8
In the Commission's opinion, they did not obtain a sufficiently firm grasp of
the company's accounting practices and other aspects of the company's busi-
ness related thereto to enable them to make an informed judgment of its
more important affairs or the abilities and integrity of its officers. Kheel and
Castellucci relied upon the fact that Stirling Homex's independent accoun-
tants had accepted these accounting practices as being in conformity with
generally accepted accounting principles. While this reliance was understand-
able, it resulted in their making no significant effort to analyze or familiarize
themselves generally with these accounting practices . . . and their susceptibil-
ity to abuse. While they periodically asked general and conclusory questions,
they frequently obtained only superficial answers which they accepted without
further inquiry.
While the Commission recognizes the difficulties which may confront out-
side directors, particularly in a situation such as this, where management as part
of a fraudulent course of conduct to deceive the public was not willing either to
take the outside directors into their confidence or to keep them even reason-
ably well informed, this case illustrates a situation where these directors, in
the opinion of the Commission, did not provide the shareholders with any
significant protection in fact, nor did their presence on the Board have the
impact upon the company's operations which shareholders and others might
reasonably have expected.
Similarly in SEC v. Shiell,1 19 the Commission alleged that the outside direc-
tors did not exercise sufficient care with respect to the affairs of the corpora-
tion and did not go beyond officers' statements in ascertaining the state of the
business: 2 0
The minutes and agendas of the Board of Directors meetings starting in 1972
reflect that the directors had in effect relinquished substantial control over
the president. The directors, as outside directors, relied upon the president as
their sole source for all information regarding the activities and operations of
the company. The minutes do not reflect that any other officers of the com-
pany were present at the meetings nor did the directors require any other
117. [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,219, at 85,462-63 (July 16,
1975).
118. Id.
119. [1976] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 383: A-8 (Dec. 22, 1976).
120. Id. atA-lO.
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officer to report to them regarding the activities of the company to any sig-
nificant extent. The testimony of the directors indicates that they did not
deem it necessary to have other officers present at meetings for they believed
(by accepting the president's report at face value) that they were getting accu-
rate and complete information from the president. Additionally, they felt that
questioning other officers about the company's activities or, in fact, requiring
other officers to report to them independently of the president would 'consti-
tute an intrusion into the functions of management.' Even when the direc-
tors visited the company offices from time to time, and encountered other key
officers, there were few discussions regarding the company's activities.
In a similar vein, in its report to the Congress with respect to its study of
the Penn Central collapse, the Commission staff dwelt at length on the fail-
ures of the directors of Penn Central to come to grips with the worsening
situation of the corporation. The staff summarized this failure in these
words:
1 2 1
The Board failed in two principal ways. It failed to establish procedures, in-
cluding a flow of adequate financial information, to permit the board to un-
derstand what was happening and to enable it to exercise some control over
the conduct of the senior officers. Secondly, the board failed to respond to
specific warnings about the true condition of the company and about the
questionable conduct of the most important officers. As a result, the investors
were deprived of adequate and accurate information about the condition of
the company.
The Commission followed this report with the filing of a complaint naming,
among others, three outside directors of Penn Central as defendants. In the
fourth cause of action of the complaint these directors (all of whom had long
service on the board of the company and one of its predecessors, and all of
whom had backgrounds indicating familiarity with financial matters) were
charged with knowing or having reason to know that securities were being
sold without disclosure of adverse information concerning Penn Central.
122
As a part of the Commission's settlement of a complaint against Gould
Inc. and two of its officers for alleged violations of the securities laws (one of
the violations involved nondisclosure of a transaction in which the company
and some of its officers were involved, although they were not dealing with
each other), the Commission issued a report of investigation under section
21(a) of the 1934 Act describing the allegedly wrongful transactions and stat-
ing its opinion with respect to the responsibility of directors when confronted
with such transactions:
123
With regard to the review of the board of directors of management involve-
ment in a transaction affecting the company, the Commission is of the opin-
121. STAFF OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL COLLAPSE OF THE
PENN CENTRAL COMPANY 153 (1972) (submitted to the Special Committee on Investigations).
122. SEC v. Penn Central Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
94,527, complaint filed (E.D. Pa. May 2, 1974).
123. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,077, at 91,863 (D.D.C. June 9, 1977).
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ion that in such instances, the board should carefully ascertain all of the
relevant facts to determine whether the transaction is in all ways fair to the
company and to assure that it has been fully disclosed to shareholders as re-
quired by the federal securities laws. In ascertaining facts, the board should
not rely solely on information from interested management but should also
seek information from independent non-interested sources when available.
CONCLUSION
Several significant aspects of these activities of the Commission with re-
spect to corporate governance deserve comment. First, the Commission has sig-
nificantly affected corporate governance. The increasing number of outside
directors on boards, the explosive growth in the number of audit committees,
the adoption of codes of conduct by many companies, the eschewing of previ-
ously accepted business practices by multinational corporations-these and
many more developments have had their strongest impetus from the activities
of the Commission.
Second, the Commission's impact on corporate governance has been ac-
complished with surprisingly few formal actions by the Commission either in
the realm of rule making or in enforcement actions specifically aimed at di-
rectors. As noted, the most direct effort to provide standards for director
conduct-the effort to articulate guidelines-aborted. The number of actual
suits filed by the Commission against outside directors because of their con-
duct as such is only two, and in one, SEC v. Shiell, 1 24 the relationship of the
directors to the company was significantly different from the conventional
relationship of outside directors to a publicly held corporation: they had been
among the founders, were clearly the controlling persons, and in general
there was an atypical intimacy of involvement.
Third, the Commission has incontestably concluded that to administer the
securities laws effectively it is necessary to address the problem of corporate
governance. With the exception of its sponsorship of section 1 of S. 305, it
has not sought additional power from Congress. Rather it has been through
resourceful use of jawboning by Commission and staff members, skillful ex-
pansion of its enforcement powers (including imaginative settlement proposals
and provisions), and artful use of its powers to accelerate the effectiveness of
registration statements and release proxy-soliciting materials, that the Com-
mission has enormously changed the structure and governance of American
corporations.
This paper passes no judgment on either the power of the Commission to
do as it has done (though full disclosure compels admission that the writer
participated in many of the actions which have promoted these tendencies) or
the propriety of its actions. Critics of both the tendencies in general and the
124. [1976] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 383: A-8 (Dec. 22, 1976).
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particular deeds have not been wanting.1 25 These critics are undoubtedly dis-
mayed by signs that under the chairmanship of Harold M. Williams, a veteran
of both the business and the academic worlds, the effort of the Commission to
influence corporate governance will not only continue but accelerate. In an
address shortly after his accession to the chairmanship of the Commission, he
said:12 6
It is my ideal . . . that a board consist of the chief executive and outside
directors. Standards need to be set for what is expected of an outside director
in terms of behavior and performance. I would also urge that the chairman
of the board not be the chief executive officer.
What it means is that the large corporation has ceased to be private
property-even though theoretically owned by its shareholders. It is now a
quasi-public institution. If it is such a quasi-public institution, then the self-
perpetuating oligarchy that constitutes management does not have the same
rights it once had.
This is not the language of a person who will lead the Commission in a
retreat from its forward position in the field of corporate governance.
This article has not discussed the manner in which the Commission is af-
fecting corporate governance by its increased oversight of the accounting pro-
fession and its increased concern with the role of corporate counsel in the
corporate structure. The Commission appears to see an insistence upon the
expansion of the responsibilities of these professionals as a means of further-
ing management responsibility and conformity to acceptable standards of
conduct; it may be that this will prove to be the most potent weapon in the
Commission's arsenal.
125. See Freeman, The Legality of the SEC's Management Fraud Program, 31 Bus. LAW. 1295
(1976); Note, Disclosure of Corporate Payments and Practices: Conduct Regulation Through the Federal
Securities Laws. 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 681 (1977).
126. Corporate Ethics, Address by Harold M. Williams, American Assembly, Columbia Univer-
sity (April 16, 1977).
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